

Message Text

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EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT GENEVA 3468 ACTION SECSTATE 01 JUNE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 3468

EXDIS

FOR EUR/RPM

EO 11652 GDS

TAGS PFOR

SUBJ CSCE: DRAFT STATEMENT FOR USE

BY AMBASSADOR SHERER AT JUNE 7 NAC

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW USDEL DRAFT OF STATEMENT FOR USE BY
AMBASSADOR SHERER AT JUNE 7 NAC DISCUSSION OF CSCE.
WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS OR CONCURRENCE.
REVISED TEXT SHOULD BE RE-TRANSMITTED TO USNATO, INFO
USMISSION GENEVA, NOT LATER THAN JUNE 6.

2. BEGIN TEXT. MR. CHAIRMAN,

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 119117

ONCE AGAIN WE WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CSCE
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY SINCE THIS MEETING
COMES AT A KEY MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFERENCE.
WE HOPE OUR DISCUSSION TODAY WILL HELP TO HARMONIZE OUR

VIEWS ON CSCE AS WE APPROACH THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN OTTAWA, AND WILL REINFORCE THE UNITY OF BASIC ATTITUDES WHICH HAS GENERALLY CHARACTERIZED ALLIED COORDINATION IN GENEVA.

BEFORE MENTIONING ONE OR TWO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN CSCE, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE GENERAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE CONFERENCE, AS THOSE WHO HAVE SPOKEN BEFORE ME HAVE DONE. IN DOING SO, I WILL TRY TO CONCENTRATE MY REMARKS ON SOME OF THE ESSENTIAL SUBJECTS MENTIONED IN THE PAPER OF THE NINE WHICH WAS DISTRIBUTED TO US ALL LAST WEEK.

OUR VIEW OF THE OVERALL SITUATION IN CSCE IS THAT PRESENT PROGRESS IS NOT UNREASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WITH THE OBVIOUS EXCEPTIONS OF MILITARY ASPECTS AND BASKET III. THE IMPASSE IN THESE AREAS IS DISAPPOINTING AND FRUSTRATING; AT THIS POINT, MOST OF US WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO FINISH THE CONFERENCE AND GO HOME. BUT, DESPITE OUR PERSONAL FEELINGS, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO BEAR IN MIND THE BROADER EAST-WEST SITUATION, AND THE REALITIES OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIETS. A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF CSCE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS IS, IN OUR VIEW, FUNDAMENTAL TO THE NEGOTIATING DISCIPLINE WHICH WE WILL REQUIRE IF CSCE IS TO BE BROUGHT TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PROBLEMS IN GENEVA SHOULD NOT CAUSE US TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT CSCE IS ONLY ONE OF SEVERAL PROJECTS WHICH WE ALL HOPE WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROCESS OF DETENTE. WE IN THE UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO SEE THIS CONFERENCE AS A MODEST, BUT IMPORTANT, STEP FORWARD WITHIN THE BROAD FRAMEWORK OF DETENTE, AND I BELIEVE THIS ATTITUDE IS SHARED BY MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED HERE. THIS PROCESS OF DETENTE HAS INCLUDED OTHER MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE ON BERLIN AND, CURRENTLY, ON MBFR, AS WELL AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 119117

BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES. IT IS EASY FOR THOSE OF US WHO ARE INVOLVED IN CSCE TO SEE IT AS A SUMMATION OF DETENTE, AT ONCE ITS TEST AND ITS CLIMAX. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NO SUCH AMBITIONS FOR CSCE, AND OUR EXPECTATIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE CONFERENCE RESULTS ARE TEMPERED BY THE BROADER PERSPECTIVE OF DETENTE. WE BELIEVE THE WEST SHOULD WORK FOR POSITIVE RESULTS IN CSCE, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD NOT SET THE CSCE PRICE SO HIGH AS TO PROVOKE A REAPPRAISAL BY THE SOVIETS OF DETENTE POLICIES IN OTHER AREAS WHICH ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO US.

LIKEWISE, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR PREOCCUPATION WITH OUR PRESENT PROBLEMS IN GENEVA SHOULD NOT LEAD US TO FORGET THE HARD

REALITIES OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS REQUIRE GREAT PATIENCE AND SELF CONTROL, AND THAT, AS SOMEONE HAS SAID, ONE OF THE SECRETS TO SUCCESS IS TO BE PREPARED TO WAIT LONGER THAN THEY ARE.

I THINK THIS MOTTO IS WORTH RECALLING NOW BECAUSE I AM AFRAID OUR IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION MAY LEAD US TOWARD ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY IN KEEPING WITH OUT OVERALL OBJECTIVES. IN SAYING THIS I ASSUME THAT OUR WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN CSCE ARE, BROADLY SPEAKING, TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD DETENTE WHILE AVOIDING MEASURES DETRIMENTAL TO OUR OWN INTERESTS. I BELIEVE SUCH OBJECTIVES CAN BE SERVED BY A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO CSCE, BUT NOT BY A FAILURE.

IF WE ARE, INDEED, INTERESTED IN A SUCCESSFUL CSCE, I CAN SEE NO COURSE FOR US BUT THE PATIENT, FIRM, LOW-KEY APPROACH WHICH HAS BROUGHT RESULTS IN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FOUR-POWER NEGOTIATIONS ON BERLIN.

THERE HAS BEEN MUCH TALK RECENTLY OF POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESENT STALEMATE OVER BASKET III SUBJECTS. OUR VIEW IS THAT MANY OF THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRM, PATIENT, LOW-KEY APPROACH I DESCRIBED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE AGREE THAT WESTERN DIS-SATISFACTION WITH THE PRESENT PACE OF CSCE WORK AND SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO MOVE ON BASKET III ISSUES SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 119117

MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS. BUT WE FEEL IT COULD WELL BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE IF THIS IS DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO PUT THE SOVIETS UNDER PUBLIC PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN AREAS WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE FOR THEM, BOTH PRACTICALLY AND IDEOLOGICALLY. WE WOULD HOPE TO AVOID ANYTHING WHICH LOOKED LIKE PUBLIC PRESSURE OR WHICH SOUNDED LIKE AN ULTIMATUM. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, PRIVATE DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS OR AT A HIGH LEVEL WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE STEP AT THIS TIME.

WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL TO MAKE A GENERAL OBSERVATION. DESPITE SOME HINTS, THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO DISPOSITION YET TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON MILITARY QUESTIONS. THE SECOND READING OF THE DRAFT TEXT SO FAR HAS PRODUCED LITTLE MORE THAN A RESTATEMENT OF POSITIONS TAKEN DURING THE DRAFTING PROCESS. WE ARE ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT THE NEUTRALS HAVE NOT TO ANY EXTENT LOWERED THEIR SIGHTS AND AMBITIONS. HERE AGAIN WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO EXERCISE GREAT PATIENCE AS NATO SOLIDARITY ONCE MORE IS TESTED. WE BELIEVE THE POSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN NATO ON MILITARY SECURITY ARE SOUND AND THAT WE SHOULD

ALL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THEM AT LEAST UNTIL THE SOVIETS SHOW THEIR HAND. CLOSE COORDINATION OF TACTICS WILL BE ESSENTIAL IN THIS PROCESS.

AS FOR THE THOUGHTS WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN EXPRESSED ON THE TIMING OF THE END OF PHASE II AND THE CONVENING OF PHASE III, WE WOULD HOPE TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE NOT YET RULED OUT ANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, AND CONSIDER THAT ALL POSSIBILITIES REMAIN OPEN. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY WESTERN DECISION WHICH MAY HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE TIMING OF THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE--SUCH AS PROPOSALS FOR RECESS, POSTPONEMENT, OR INTERRUPTION OF PHASE II -- MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING RAMIFICATIONS, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVIEWED CAREFULLY IN CAPITALS AND IN THIS COUNCIL BEFORE ACTION IS TAKEN.

MR CHAIRMAN, IN ADDITION TO THESE GENERAL REMARKS, I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION TWO SPECIFIC SUBJECTS RELATING TO CSCE WHICH MAY REQUIRE FURTHER REFLECTION IN THE WEEKS
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 119117

AHEAD. THESE ARE THE TREATMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN IN THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS, AND FOLLOW-UP.

I SAID EARLIER THAT WE BELIEVE CSCE HAS A SIGNIFICANT, BUT LIMITED, PLACE IN THE PROCESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN OUR APPROACH TO THE CONFERENCE, AND WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD GUIDE OUR ATTITUDES EVEN MORE STRONGLY IN WHAT WE ALL HOPE WILL BE THE FINAL WEEKS OF PHASE II WORK. THIS CONCEPT OF A CSCE FOCUSED ON EUROPEAN PROBLEMS IS BASIC TO OUR OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF A CSCE DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. AS WE FEARED, THE PROPOSAL FOR A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION HAS DISTORTED THIS QUESTION OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ITS IMPORTANCE IN RELATION TO THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE CONFERENCE.

THIS IS CERTAINLY UNFORTUNATE, SINCE OUR POSITIONS IN CSCE SHOULD BE BASED ON SOUND LOGIC AND A CAREFULLY REASONED JOINT DETERMINATION OF OUR SHARED OBJECTIVES, RATHER THAN ON ANY PARTICULAR AXES WE MAY HAVE TO GRIND. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE HAVE SO CAREFULLY EXPLAINED OUR OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF A MEDITERRANEAN DECLARATION ON REPEATED OCCASIONS, IN GENEVA AND IN THIS COUNCIL, FROM THE FIRST DAY THE IDEA WAS MENTIONED TO US. I AM RATHER SURPRISED THAT THIS SUBJECT HAS NOT AROUSED GREATER INTEREST IN NATO, SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF THE CONTINUING PROJECTS UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COUNCIL IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF "MEASURES TO COUNTER SOVIET EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN." I BELIEVE I AM ALSO CORRECT IN THINKING THAT NATO HAS ALWAYS CONSIDERED THE MEDITERRANEAN A SUBJECT OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. IF ANY NATO MEMBER COUNTRY IS TO SUGGEST A COURSE OF ACTION

RELATING TO THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CSCE, WE BELIEVE THAT COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE THE FULL CONSENSUS AND SUPPORT OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THIS ALLIANCE. FOR OUR PART, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT A CSCE DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN MAY WELL HAVE THE EFFECT OF RECOGNIZING AND LEGITIMATIZING SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BY GIVING THEM MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSIBILITIES EQUAL TO THOSE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES OF NATO, AS A CO-SIGNER OF THE ONLY EXISTING DOCUMENT WHICH ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA. SUCH AN EFFECT WOULD
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 119117

BE PROFOUNDLY CONTRARY TO ALLIED INTERESTS. IT WOULD BE IRONICAL INDEED IF WE OURSELVES WERE TO HAND THE SOVIETS SUCH AN ADVANTAGE. WE WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT A DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESTION BE UNDERTAKEN URGENTLY IN NATO.

THE SECOND SPECIFIC SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE IS FOLLOW-UP. BRIEFLY, MR CHAIRMAN, WE ARE NOT YET CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR A FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM WITH A GENERAL POLITICAL-SECURITY MANDATE. WE HAVE GIVEN GENERAL SUPPORT TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE NINE FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD FOLLOWED BY A MEETING OF HIGH OFFICIALS TO EVALUATE CSCE RESULTS. BUT THERE IS ONE ASPECT OF THE DANISH PROPOSAL ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH WE FEEL GOES BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY OR WISE AT THIS TIME. WE HAVE MENTIONED THIS POINT IN THE NATO CAUCUS IN GENEVA, AND I WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT IT HERE, SINCE I BELIEVE IT HAS BROAD IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. THE DANISH PAPER STATES THAT, IN ADDITION TO EVALUATION CONFERENCE RESULTS, THE HIGH LEVEL MEETING SHOULD EVALUATE "THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN GENERAL." WE FEEL THIS MANDATE IS TOO OPEN-ENDED, AND WOULD PERMIT DISCUSSION OF MBFR, OR OTHER ISSUES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF CSCE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT, AS IN CSCE PHASE I, NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES MAY REFER TO A BROAD RANGE OF SUBJECTS DURING THE MEETING OF HIGH OFFICIALS, BUT WE SEE NO NEED TO JUSTIFY THIS THOUGH SUCH A BROAD MANDATE. WE WOULD PREFER A MANDATE CONFINED TO "DISCUSSION OTHER ISSUES FALLING WITHIN THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE," OR SOME SIMILAR LANGUAGE. I THINK THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DIFFERENCE WILL NOT BE LOST ON ANYONE HERE.

MR CHAIRMAN, THIS COVERS THE POINTS I WANTED TO MAKE, AND I CAN ONLY REPEAT ONCE AGAIN THE VALUE WE ATTACH TO OUR DISCUSSIONS OF CSCE HERE AT NATO, AND TO THE COUNCIL'S INTEREST IN THE CONFERENCE. ABRAMS UNQTE KISSINGER

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